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We study the macroeconomic information conveyed by transaction ﬂows in the foreign exchange
market. We present a new genre of model for the concurrent empirical link between spot prices
and transaction ﬂows that produces two new implications for forecasting: (i) transaction ﬂows
should have incremental forecasting power for future fundamentals relative to current spot prices
and fundamentals, and (ii) transaction ﬂows should have forecasting power for future excess returns
if the information conveyed aﬀects the risk premium. Both predictions are borne out empirically.
Transaction ﬂows in the EUR/USD market forecast GDP growth, money growth, and inﬂation.
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Exchange rate movements at frequencies of one year or less remain unexplained by macroeco-
nomic variables (Meese and Rogoﬀ 1983, Frankel and Rose 1995, Cheung et al. 2005). In their
survey, Frankel and Rose (1995) conclude that “no model based on such standard fundamentals
... will ever succeed in explaining or predicting a high percentage of the variation in the exchange
rate, at least at short- or medium-term frequencies.” Seven years later, Cheung et al.’s (2005)
comprehensive study concludes that “no model consistently outperforms a random walk.”
We address this core puzzle in international economics from a new angle. Rather than attempt-
ing to link ex-post macro variables to exchange rates directly, we focus instead on the intermediate
market-based process that impounds macro information into exchange rates. In particular, we
theoretically and empirically examine the idea that exchange rates respond to the ﬂow of infor-
mation concerning future macroeconomic conditions conveyed via the trades of end-users in the
foreign exchange market. The results reported below strongly support for this idea. More gen-
erally, they provide an example from the world’s most liquid ﬁnancial market of how asset prices
embed information concerning future macroeconomic conditions via a market-based process.
Our theoretical analysis is based a new genre of exchange rate model that incorporates elements
of monetary macro models (e.g., Engel and West 2006, Engel et al. 2007 and Mark 2009), and
the elements of currency trading found in microstructure models (Evans and Lyons 1999). Our
model incorporates two key features: First, only some of the macro information relevant for the
current spot exchange rate at any point in time is known publicly. Other information is present in
the economy, but exists in a dispersed microeconomic form in the sense of Hayek (1945). Second,
the spot exchange rate is literally determined as the price of foreign currency quoted by foreign
exchange dealers. As a consequence, dealers ﬁnd it optimal to vary their spot rate quotes as they
revise their forecasts of future macroeconomic fundamentals in response to the information they
learn from their transactions with other agents. The model not only provides a theoretical basis for
the strong empirical link between spot rates and transaction ﬂows concurrently (see, for example,
Evans and Lyons 2002a & 2002b), it also delivers two new implications for forecasting: First,
transaction ﬂows should have incremental forecasting power for future fundamentals relative to
current spot rates and fundamentals. Second, dealers may use this information rationally to adjust
the risk premium they embed in their future spot rate quotes. When this is the case, transaction
ﬂows will have forecasting power for future excess returns.
We investigate these empirical predictions using a data set that comprises USD/EUR spot
rates, transaction ﬂows and macro fundamentals over six and a half years. The transaction ﬂows
come from Citibank. We employ a novel empirical strategy that decomposes future realizations
of macro variables, such as GDP growth, into a sequence of weekly information ﬂows. These
1information ﬂows are then used to test whether transaction ﬂows convey incremental information
about future macroeconomic conditions. This strategy provides more precise estimates of the
information contained in transaction ﬂows than traditional forecasting regressions — a fact reﬂected
in the strong statistical signiﬁcance of our ﬁndings. In particular we ﬁnd that:
1. Transaction ﬂows in the USD/EUR market have signiﬁcant forecasting power for future in-
formation ﬂows concerning GDP growth, money growth, and inﬂa t i o ni nb o t ht h eU Sa n d
Germany over horizons ranging from two weeks to two quarters. These ﬁndings strongly indi-
cate that transaction ﬂows contain signiﬁcant information about future GDP growth, money
growth, and inﬂation.
2. Transaction ﬂows have incremental forecasting power beyond that contained in the history of
exchange rates and other asset prices/interest rates.
3. Transaction ﬂows forecast about 14 percent of future exchange rate returns at a monthly
horizon via the information they carry concerning future macroeconomic conditions. This
level of forecasting power is at least 4-5 times larger than that of the forward discount. It
suggests that the market uses the macro information in transaction ﬂows to adjust the risk
p r e m i u me m b e d d e di ns p o tr a t eq u o t e s .
To our knowledge, these ﬁndings and those in this paper’s earlier version (Evans and Lyons 2004a)
are the ﬁrst to link transaction ﬂows to macro fundamentals in the future and also to the dynamics
of the foreign exchange risk premium. In contrast to the forecasting focus of this paper, Evans
(2009) documents the links between current macro fundamentals, ﬂows and exchange rates. Taken
together, these ﬁndings provide strong support for the idea that exchange rates vary as the market
assimilates dispersed macroeconomic information from transaction ﬂows.
Our analysis is related to several strands of the international ﬁnance literature. From a theo-
retical perspective, our model includes two novel ingredients: dispersed information and a micro-
based rationale for trade in the foreign exchange market. Dispersed information does not exist in
textbook models: relevant information is either symmetric economy-wide, or, sometimes, asym-
metrically assigned to a single agent — the central bank. As a result, no textbook model predicts
that market-wide transaction ﬂows should drive exchange rates. In recent research, Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2006) examine the dynamics of the exchange rate in a rational expectations model
with dispersed information. Our model shares some of the same informational features, but derives
the equilibrium dynamics from the equilibrium trading strategies of foreign exchange dealers and
agents. This feature also distinguishes the model from our earlier work in Evans and Lyons (1999,
2005) where we studied exchange rate dynamics in models with exogenous transactions ﬂows. Here
2we show that endogenously determined transaction ﬂows can only convey information to dealers in
an equilibrium where information is incomplete.
From a empirical perspective, our analysis is closely related to the work of Engel and West
(2005). They ﬁnd that spot rates have forecasting power for future macro fundamentals, as text-
book models predict. Indeed, our model makes the same empirical prediction. The novel aspect
of our analysis, relative to Engel and West (2005), is that we investigate the speciﬁc mechanism
under which the exchange rate responds to transaction ﬂows because they induce a change in “the
market’s” expectations about future fundamentals. From this perspective, our ﬁndings should be
viewed as complementing theirs. Our analysis is also related to earlier research by Froot and Ra-
madorai (2005), hereafter F&R. These authors examine VAR relationships between real exchange
rates, excess currency returns, real interest diﬀerentials, and the transaction ﬂows of institutional
investors. In contrast to our results, they ﬁnd little evidence that these ﬂows can forecast funda-
mentals. Our analysis diﬀers from F&R in three respects. First, our empirical methods provide
more precise estimates of the information contained in transaction ﬂows than traditional forecast-
ing regressions/VARs. Second, we analyze transaction ﬂows that fully span the demand for foreign
currency, not just institutional investors. This facet of our ﬂow data proves to be empirically im-
portant. Third, we require no assumption about exchange rate behavior in the long run, whereas
the variance decompositions F&R use rely on long-run purchasing power parity.
The remainder of the paper has three sections. Section 1 presents the theoretical model. Section
2 describes our strategy for estimating the forecasting power of transaction ﬂows. We then present
the data and our empirical results. Section 3 concludes.
1T h e M o d e l
This section presents a micro-based model of exchange rate dynamics that identiﬁes how information
relevant for forecasting future macroeconomic conditions becomes embedded in the spot exchange
rate. The model has three essential elements. First, the spot rate is determined as the price in the
foreign exchange market as quoted by dealers. In this respect, the model incorporates features of
the trading models in Evans and Lyons (1999 & 2004b). Second, and unlike those earlier trading
models, the model identiﬁes order ﬂow endogenously. It does so by using the portfolio choices of end-
users, i.e., agents whose primary activity lies outside the foreign exchange market. These choices are
driven by current macroeconomic conditions in a manner consistent with recent research on open
economy models of portfolio choice (e.g., Evans and Hnatkovska 2005, Van Wincoop and Tille 2007,
and Devereux and Sutherland 2006), and exchange rate models incorporating Taylor rules (e.g.,
Engel and West 2006 and Mark 2009). Third, dealers and agents have diﬀerent and incomplete
information about the current state of the macroeconomy. It is the richness of this information
3structure that produces the novel implications of the model for the behavior of exchange rates,
order ﬂow, and the forecasting power of these variables for future macroeconomic conditions.
1.1 Structure
Our economy comprises two countries populated by a continuum of risk-averse agents indexed
by n ∈ [0,1], and d risk-averse dealers who act as market-makers in the spot market for foreign
currency. We refer to home and foreign countries as the US and Europe, so the log spot exchange
rate, st, denotes the dollar price of euros. The only other actors in the model are the central banks
(i.e., the Federal Reserve (FED) and the European Central Bank (ECB)), who conduct monetary
policy by setting short-term nominal interest rates.
1.1.1 Dealers
The pattern of trading in actual foreign exchange markets is extremely complex. On the one hand,
foreign exchange dealers quote prices at which they stand ready to buy or sell foreign currency
to agents and other dealers. On the other, each dealer can initiate trades against other dealers’
quotes, and can submit both market and limit orders to electronic brokerages. We will not attempt
to capture this trading activity in any detail. Instead, we focus on the price dealers quote at the
start of each trading week. In particular, we assume that the log spot price quoted by all dealers
at the start of week t is given by
st = Ed
t st+1 +ˆ rt − rt − δt, (1)
where Ed
t denotes expectations conditioned on the common information available to all dealers at
the start of week t, Ωd
t . This information set includes rt and ˆ rt, which are the one-week dollar and
euro interest rates set by the FED and ECB, respectively. (Hereafter we use hats, "ˆ", to denote
European variables.) The last term on the right, δt, is a risk premium — positive is added return
on euro holdings — that dealers choose to manage risk eﬃciently. This risk premium is determined
below as a function of dealers’ common information, Ωd
t .
In the currency trading models of Lyons (1997) and Evans and Lyons (1999 & 2004b), the
spot exchange rate is determined by the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) quote strategy of a
game between the dealers played over multiple trading rounds. Our speciﬁcation in equation (1)
incorporates three features of the PBE quotes in these trading models: First, each dealer quotes the
same price to agents and other dealers. Second, quotes are common across all dealers. Third, all
quotes are a function of common information, Ωd
t . It is important to realize that our speciﬁcation
in (1) does not implicitly restrict all dealers to have the same information. On the contrary,
4dealers will generally possess heterogenous information, which they use in forming their optimal
trading strategies. However, in so far as our focus is on the behavior of the spot rate (rather than
dealer trading), equation (1) implies that we can concentrate our attention on the part of dealers’
information that is common, Ωd
t .
Equation (1) says that the price quoted by all dealers at the start of week t is equal to the
expected payoﬀ from holding foreign currency until the next week, Ed
t st+1+ˆ rt−rt, less a premium,
δt. In models of currency trading, the size of this premium is determined by the requirements of
eﬃcient risk-sharing. More speciﬁcally, in an economy where their is a ﬁnite number of risk-averse
dealers and a continuum of risk-averse agents of suﬃcient mass, dealers will choose δt such that
their expected holdings of risky currencies at the end of week t are zero. This implication of risk-
sharing accords well with the actual behavior of dealers, who are restricted on the size of their
overnight positions (Lyons 1995).
To implement this risk-sharing implication, we assume that all dealers are located in the US.
They therefore choose the risk premium, δt, such that their expected holdings of euros at the end
of week t equal zero. These holdings are determined by the history of order ﬂow from all agents.
In particular, let xt+1 denote the aggregate of all orders from agents for euros received by dealers
during week t,2 so It+1 = −
P∞
i=0 xt+1−i denotes the euro holdings of all dealers at the end of week-t
trading. Eﬃcient risk-sharing requires that dealers choose a value for δt such that
Ed
t It+1 =0 . (2)
Clearly, this restriction makes δt af u n c t i o no fd e a l e r s ’c o m m o ni n f o r m a t i o n ,Ωd
t .3
Recent exchange rate research by Engel et al. (2007) stresses the importance of identifying
expected future interest rates consistent with their use as policy instruments by central banks.
With this in mind we assume that dealers’ interest rate expectations incorporate a view on how
central banks react to changes in the macroeconomy. In particular, we assume that
Ed
t (ˆ rt+i − rt+i)=( 1+γπ)Ed
t (∆ˆ pt+1+i − ∆pt+1+i)+γyEd
t (ˆ yt+i − yt+i) − γεEd
t εt+i, (3)
for i>0, where γπ,γy, and γε are positive coeﬃcients. Equation (3) says that dealers expect the
future diﬀerential between euro and dollar rates to be higher when: (i) the future diﬀerence between
2We identify the order ﬂow from week-t trading with a subscript of t+1to emphasize the fact that dealers cannot
use the information it conveys until the start of week t +1 .
3This implication of eﬃcient risk-sharing also applies if dealers are distributed in both countries. In this case, It+1
represents the US dealers’ holding of euros minus the euro value of EU dealers’ dollar holdings at the end of week-t
trading. Eﬃcient risk-sharing now requires that the expected value of the foreign currency holdings of all dealers are
equalized, i.e. E
d
tIt+1 =0 , after dealers have had the opportunity to trade with each other. By assuming that all
dealers are located in the US, we are simply abstracting from the need to model intradealer trade.
5EU and US inﬂation, ∆ˆ pt+1 − ∆pt+1, is higher, (ii) the diﬀerence between the EU and US output
gaps, ˆ yt − yt, widens, or (iii) when the real exchange rate, εt ≡ st +ˆ pt − pt, depreciates. The ﬁrst
two terms are consistent with the widely-accepted view that central banks react to higher domestic
inﬂation and output by raising short-term interest rates. The third term captures the idea that
some central banks can be expected to react to deviations in the spot rate from its purchasing power
parity level (i.e., the real exchange rate, εt), a notion that ﬁnds empirical support in Clarida, Galı,
and Gertler (1998). We should emphasize that equation (3) embodies an assumption about how
dealers’ expectations concerning future interest rates are related to their expectations concerning
macro variables (e.g., inﬂation and output), rather than an assumption about whether central banks
actually follow particular reaction functions, such as a Taylor-rule.
Dealers have access to both private and public sources of information. Each dealer receives
private information in the form of the currency orders from the subset of agents that trade with
them, and from the currency orders they receive from other dealers. In currency trading models,
the mapping from dealers’ individual information sets to the common information set for all dealers,
Ωd
t , is derived endogenously from the trading behavior of dealers. We will not consider this complex
process here. Instead, we characterize the evolution of Ωd
t directly under the assumption that a
week’s worth of trading is suﬃcient to reveal the size of the aggregate order ﬂow from agents to all
dealers. Thus, all dealers know the aggregate order ﬂow from week-t trading, xt+1, by the start of
week t +1 .4
Dealers receive public information in the form of macro data releases and their observations on
short-term interest rates. To characterize this information ﬂow, let zt denote a vector of variables
that completely describe the state of the macroeconomy in week t. This vector contains short-term
interest rates, rt and ˆ rt; prices, pt and ˆ pt; the output gaps, yt and ˆ yt; and other variables. A subset
of the these variables, zo
t, are contemporaneously observable to all dealers and agents. We assume
that the other elements of zt only become publicly known via macro data releases with a reporting
lag of k weeks. The presence of the reporting lag is an important feature of our model and accords
with reality. For example, data on US GDP in the ﬁrst quarter is only released by The Bureau of
Economic Analysis several weeks into the second quarter, so the reporting lag for US output can
4This assumption is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of currency trading models and the available empirical
evidence. In the PBE of the Evans and Lyons (1999) model, all dealers can correctly infer aggregate order ﬂow from
agents before they quote spot rates at the end of each trading day because intraday interdealer trading is informative
about the currency orders each dealer receives from agents. Empirical support for this feature of the PBE comes in
two forms. First, as Evans and Lyons (2002b & 2002a) show, aggregate order ﬂows from intraday interdealer trading
account for between 40 and 80 percent of the variation in daily, end-of-day, spot rate quotes. This would not be the
case if dealers were unable to make precise inferences about aggregate customer order ﬂows from interdealer trading
before they quoted spot rates at the end of each day. Second, the variation in daily end-of-day spot rate quotes cannot
be forecast by aggregate interdealer order ﬂow on prior trading days (see, for example, Sager and Taylor 2008). If it
took several days worth of interdealer trading before dealers could make accurate inferences concerning the aggregate
order ﬂow from agents, interdealer order ﬂow would have forecasting power for future changes in quotes.
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With these assumptions, the evolution of dealers’ common information is given by
Ωd
t =
©
zo
t,z t−k,x t,Ωd
t−1
ª
, (4)
where {zo
t,z t−k} identify the source of the public information ﬂow, and xt identiﬁe st h es o u r c eo f
the information ﬂow observed by all dealers.
1.1.2 Agents and the Macroeconomy
Since our aim is to examine how macroeconomic information is transmitted to dealers, there is no
need to describe every aspect of agents’ behavior. Instead, we focus on their demand for foreign
currency. In particular, we assume that the demand for euros in week t by agent n ∈ [0,1] can be
represented by
αn
t = αs (En
t ∆st+1 +ˆ rt − rt)+hn
t , (5)
where αs > 0 and En
t denotes expectations conditioned on the information available to agent n after
observing the spot rate at the start of week t, Ωn
t . Equation (5) decomposes the demand for euros
into two terms. The ﬁrst is the (log) excess return expected by the agent, En
t ∆st+1 +ˆ rt − rt, the
second is a hedging term, hn
t , that represents the inﬂuence of all other factors. This representation
of foreign currency demand is very general. For example, it could be derived from a mean-variance
portfolio choice model, or from an OLG portfolio model such as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2006). In these cases, the hn
t term identiﬁes the expected returns on other assets and the hedging
demand induced by the exposure of the agent’s future income to exchange rate risk. Alternatively,
the representation in (5) could be derived as an approximation to the optimal currency demand
implied by an intertemporal portfolio choice problem, as in Evans and Hnatkovska (2005). In this
case the hn
t term would also incorporate the eﬀects of variations in the agent’s wealth.
Without loss of generality, we assume that hn
t = αhzn
t , for some vector αh, where zn
t is a vector
of variables that describes the observable microeconomic environment of agent n. This environ-
ment includes publicly observable macro variables, such as interest rates, and the micro data that
inﬂuences all aspects of the agent’s behavior. The agent’s environment is linked to the state of
the macroeconomy by zn
t = zt + vn
t , where vn
t =[ vn
i,t] i sav e c t o ro fa g e n t - s p e c i ﬁc shocks with the
property that
R 1
0 vn
i,tdn =0for all i. We can now use (5), to write the aggregate demand for euros
by agents as
αt ≡
Z 1
0
αn
t dn = αs(E
n
t st+1 − st +ˆ rt − rt)+ht, (6)
where ht ≡
R 1
0 hn
t dn =αhzt is the aggregate hedging demand and E
n
t denotes the average of agents’
7expectations: E
n
t st+1 =
R 1
0 En
t st+1dn.
Like dealers, each agent has access to both private and public sources of information. The
former comes in the form of information about the microeconomic environment, zn
t . Each agent
also receives public information about the macroeconomy from macro data releases, the short-
term interest rates set by central banks, and from the spot exchange rate quoted by dealers. The
e v o l u t i o no fa g e n tn’s information can therefore be represented as
Ωn
t =
©
zo
t,z t−k,s t,zn
t ,Ωn
t−1
ª
, (7)
for n ∈ [0,1].
Two points need emphasis here. First, in accordance with reality, agents do not observe ag-
gregate order ﬂow, xt. Order ﬂow is a source of information to dealers not agents. Second, and
most importantly, we do not assume that any agent has private information about the future the
microeconomic environments they will face or future macroeconomic conditions. Exchange rates
will only have forecasting power for future macroeconomic variables insofar as dealers can extract
useful information about current macro conditions from agents’ currency orders.
All that now remains is to characterize the behavior of the macroeconomy. In an open economy
macro model this would be done by aggregating the optimal decisions of agents with respect to
consumption, saving, investment, and price-setting in a manner consistent with market clearing
given assumptions about productivity, preference shocks, and the conduct of monetary/ﬁscal policy.
Fortunately, for our purposes, we can avoid going into all this detail. Instead, it suﬃces to identify
a few elements of the zt vector, and to represent its dynamics in a reduced form. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that the inﬂation, interest, price and output diﬀerentials comprise the ﬁrst four elements
of zt,
z0
t =[∆ˆ pt − ∆pt, ˆ rt − rt, ˆ pt − pt, ˆ yt − yt,. . . ,. . . ],
and that the dynamics of zt c a nb ew r i t t e na s
zt = Azzt−1 + Buut, (8)
for some matrices Az and Bu, where ut is a vector of mean zero serially uncorrelated shocks. We
should emphasize that this representation of the macroeconomic dynamics is completely general
because we have not placed any restrictions on the other variables included in the zt vector. Evans
and Lyons (2004b) provides a detailed description of the equilibrium dynamics of an open economy
macro model with a similar structure.
81.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium information ﬂows from dealers to agents via their spot rate quotes, and from agents
to dealers via order ﬂow. Figure 1 shows the timing of events and the ﬂows of information within
each week. At the start of week t, all dealers and agents receive public information in the form of
data releases on past economic activity, zt−k, and observations on other macro variables including
the short-term interest rates set by central banks, zo
t = {rt, ˆ rt,..}. Each agent n also receives private
information concerning his or her current microeconomic environment, zn
t . Next, all dealers use their
common information, Ωd
t , to quote a log spot price, st, that is observable to all agents. Each agent
n then uses their private information, Ωn
t , to place a foreign currency order with a dealer, who ﬁlls
it at the spot rate st. For the remainder of the week, dealers trade among themselves. As a result of
this activity all dealers learn the aggregate order ﬂow, xt+1, that resulted from the earlier week−t
trades between agents and dealers.
Week Event Information Flow to
Dealers Agents
t
Data released on past macroeconomic activity and zt−k zt−k
Central Banks set interest rates zo
t zo
t
Each agent n observes her microeconomic
environment zn
t
Dealers quote log spot price st
Agents initiate trade against dealers’ quotes
producing aggregate order ﬂow, which becomes
known to all dealers via interdealer trading xt+1
t +1
Figure 1: Model Timing and Information Flows
In equilibrium the aggregate order ﬂow received by dealers during week-t trading must equal
the aggregate change in the demand for euros across all agents:
xt+1 = αt − αt−1. (9)
This market-clearing condition implies that xt+1 is a function of the microeconomic environments
facing all agents in weeks t and t−1, and their expectations concerning future excess returns which
are based on agents’ private information, Ωn
t and Ωn
t−1 a ss h o w ni ne q u a t i o n( 6 ) .
Equilibrium spot rate quotes satisfy (1) subject to the restriction in (2) that identiﬁes the risk
premium and dealer expectations concerning future interest rates in (3). In particular, combining
9(1) with (3) and iterating forward assuming that limi→∞ Ed
t ρist+1 =0gives
Ed
t st+1 = Ed
t
∞ X
i=1
ρi(mt+i − δt+i), (10)
with ρ ≡ 1/(1 + γε) < 1, where mt = γπ (∆ˆ pt+1 − ∆pt+1)+γy (ˆ yt − yt)+
1−ρ
ρ (pt − ˆ pt). Equation
(10) identiﬁes dealers’ expectations for next week’s spot rate in terms of their forecasts for macro
fundamentals, mt, and the risk premium, δt. Substituting this expression into (1) gives the following
equation for the equilibrium spot rate:
st =ˆ rt − rt + Ed
t
∞ P
i=1
ρimt+i − Ed
t
∞ P
i=0
ρiδt+i. (11)
The three terms on the right of equation (11) identify diﬀerent factors aﬀecting the log spot
rate that dealers quote at the start of week t. First, the current stance of monetary policy in the US
and EU aﬀects dealers’ quotes via the interest diﬀerential, ˆ rt − rt, because it directly contributes
to the payoﬀ from holding euros until week t +1 . Second, dealers are concerned with the future
course of macro fundamentals, mt. This term embodies dealers’ expectations of how central banks
will react to macroeconomic conditions when setting future interest rates. The third factor arises
from risk-sharing between dealers and agents as represented by the present and expected future
values of the risk premium. This risk-sharing implication is unique to our micro-based model, and
plays an important role in the analysis below.
Recall that dealers choose the risk premium so that Ed
t It+1 =0 , where It+1 denotes their
aggregate holdings of euros at the end of week-t trading. By deﬁnition, It+1 = It − xt+1,s ot h e
market clearing condition in (9) implies that It+1 + αt = It + αt−1 = I1 + α0.F o r c l a r i t y , w e
normalize I1 + α0 to zero, so the eﬃcient risk-sharing condition in (2) becomes 0=Ed
t αt = αs
Ed
t (E
n
t st+1−st+ˆ rt−rt)+Ed
t ht. Combining this expression with the fact that Ed
t ∆st+1+ˆ rt−rt = δt
from equation (1), gives
δt = Ed
t se
t+1 − α−1
s Ed
t ht, (12)
where se
t+1 = st+1 − E
n
t st+1. Thus, the dealers’ choice for the risk premium depends on their
estimates of the aggregate hedging demand for euros, Ed
t ht, and the average error agents make
when forecasting next week’s spot rate, se
t+1. Intuitively, dealers lower the risk premium when they
anticipate a rise in the aggregate hedging demand for euros because the implied fall in the excess
return agents’ expect will oﬀset their desire to accumulate larger euro holdings. Dealers also reduce
the risk premium to oﬀset agents’ desire to accumulate larger euro holdings when they are viewed
as being too optimistic (on average) about the future spot rate; i.e. when Ed
t st+1 < Ed
t E
n
t st+1.
10We now combine (11) with (12) to identify the information spot rate quotes convey to agents:
st =ˆ rt − rt + Ed
t
∞ X
i=1
ρimt+i + 1
αsEd
t
∞ X
i=0
ρiht+i − 1
ρEd
t
∞ X
i=1
ρise
t+i. (13)
Here we see that spot rates embed dealers’ expectations about future macro fundamentals, mt,
current and future aggregate hedging demands, ht, and agents’ future average forecast errors, se
t.
These expectations are conditioned on dealers’ common information set, Ωd
t , which includes past
order ﬂows (i.e., xt−i, for i ≥ 0) that were not observed by agents. Thus, insofar as these past
ﬂows carry price-relevant information to dealers, the quoted value of st will convey incremental
information to agents that they can use in determining their week−t currency orders.
Agents’ currency orders convey information to dealers via order ﬂow. In particular, since dealers
know the history of order ﬂow and αt−1 =
P∞
i=0 xt−i by market clearing, αt−1 ∈ Ωd
t . Consequently,
unexpected order ﬂow from week-t trading is xt+1−Ed
t xt+1 =( αt−αt−1)−Ed
t (αt−αt−1)=αt−Ed
t αt.
Substituting for αt in this expression using (6) and (12) gives
xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1 = ht − Ed
t ht + αs(E
n
t st+1 − Ed
t [E
n
t st+1]). (14)
Thus unexpected order ﬂow contains new information about the hedging demand, ht, and about the
average of agents’ spot rate forecasts, E
n
t st+1.B o t ho ft h e s ef a c t o r sd e p e n do nt h em i c r o e c o n o m i c
environments agents face in week t. As a consequence, order ﬂow during week t carries more timely
information about the current state of the economy — not the future state — than is available from
the most recent macro data releases. This key feature of our model lies behind the empirical
implications we analyze below.
T ot h i sp o i n tw eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed the equilibrium spot rate, risk premium and unexpected or-
der ﬂow relative dealers’ and agents’ expectations. A complete description of the equilibrium
requires the identiﬁcation of these expectations. For this purpose, we introduce a new vector,
Zt =[u0
t,u 0
t−1, ..., u0
t−k−1,z 0
t−k ]0, that contains the information that is potentially available
to dealers and agents about the state of macroeconomy in week t, zt, and about the shocks to the
economy over the past k +2weeks, {ut,u t−1,...ut−k−1}. The dynamics of Zt are easily derived
from equation (8) and may be written as
Zt = AZt−1 + But. (15)
We can now describe the equilibrium of the model.
11Proposition In equilibrium, there exists vectors Λs and Λδ such that the log spot rate, risk
premium and unexpected order ﬂow in week-t trading satisfy
st = ΛsEd
t Zt,δ t = ΛδEd
t Zt, (16a)
and xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1 = αt = αsΛδ(Zt − Ed
t Zt), (16b)
where Ed
t Zt = ΦdZt for some matrix Φd, and Zt follows (15).
The Appendix provides a detailed derivation of this proposition. Here we emphasize three
features. First, the equilibrium encompasses the special case where the ﬂow of public information
provides dealers and agents with complete information about the current state of the economy.
This is the information structure found in standard macro exchange rate models. It implies that
Zt = Ed
t Zt, so dealers can anticipate order ﬂow with complete precision: xt+1 = Ed
t xt+1. Under
these circumstances, dealers set the risk premium to a level that insures that their foreign currency
holdings are always at their optimal risk-sharing level of zero. And, as a consequence, actual order
ﬂow, xt+1, is also zero. Thus, the presence of incomplete information concerning the current state
of the economy not only accords with reality but is also a necessary condition for the existence of
(non-zero) order ﬂows.
Second, the equilibrium provides a structural explanation for the strong relationship between
high-frequency variations in spot rates and contemporaneous order ﬂows documented by Evans and
Lyons (2002a & 2002b) and many others (see Osler 2008 for a recent survey). According to our
model, this relationship exists because order ﬂows during week t convey information to dealers that
is incorporated into their estimates of potentially available information Zt+1 at the start of week
t+1. More speciﬁcally, combining the identity, st+1 = Ed
t st+1+( st+1−Ed
t st+1), with equations (1)
and (16a) gives
st+1 − st = rt − ˆ rt + δt + Λs(E
d
t+1 − Ed
t )Zt+1. (17)
Since the ﬁrst three terms on the right hand side are known to dealers at the start of week t, changes
in the log spot rate, st+1 −st, will be correlated with unexpected order ﬂow, xt+1 −Ed
t xt+1, insofar
as the latter is correlated with the revision in dealers’ expectations, (E
d
t+1 −Ed
t )Zt+1. Evans (2009)
provides a detailed examination of this correlation.
The third feature we wish to emphasize concerns the long run relationship between order ﬂow
and spot rates. Equations (9) and (16b) imply that xt+1 = αsΛδ(Zt − Ed
t Zt) −αsΛδ(Zt−1 −
Ed
t−1Zt−1), so any permanent shock to an element of Zt has no long-run eﬀect on order ﬂow: The
shock may initially aﬀect elements of Zt − Ed
t Zt and Zt−1 − Ed
t−1Zt−1, and so have a short-run
impact; but once dealers learn about its macroeconomic eﬀects, they adjust the risk premium so
that its impact on subsequent order ﬂow vanishes. At the same time, the shock can have a long-run
12eﬀect on the spot rate. Equation (16a) implies that st = ΛsZt − Λs(Zt − Ed
t Zt),s oap e r m a n e n t
shock to elements of Zt can aﬀect the spot rate via the ﬁrst term long after its macroeconomic
impact has been learnt by dealers. In sum, therefore, our model does not imply that there should
be any cointegrating (long-run) relationship between the aggregate ﬂow of agents’ foreign currency
orders cumulated through time and macro variables or the spot rate.
2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we examine the implications of our model for forecasting future macroeconomic
conditions. First we derive a key testable implication of our model regarding the forecasting power
of spot rates and order ﬂow for macro variables. We then describe the data used to estimate these
forecast relationships and present our empirical results.
2.1 Identifying the Forecasting Power of Spot Rates and Order Flow
The forecasting power of spot rates and order ﬂows come from diﬀerence sources. Spot rates have
forecasting power in our model because dealers’ quotes include their expectations concerning the
future course of macro variables and risk premia. This is clearly seen by rewriting (13) as
st − ft =
P∞
i=1 ρiEd
t ηt+i, (18)
where ηt ≡ γπ (∆ˆ pt+1 − ∆pt+1)+γy (ˆ yt − yt)−δt, and ft ≡ ˆ rt −rt −Ed
t (ˆ pt+1 − pt+1)−δt. Dealers’
quotes are aﬀected by both current macroeconomic conditions, ft, and the expected course of
future inﬂation, output gaps and the risk premia via Ed
t ηt+i. As a consequence, st − ft will have
forecasting power for any future macro variable, Mt+τ, if dealers’ forecasts, Ed
t Mt+τ, are correlated
with Ed
t ηt+i.
T h ef o r e c a s t i n gp o w e ro fo r d e rﬂows comes from the information they convey to dealers. Order
ﬂow from week-t trading will have forecasting power for Mt+τ if the information in xt+1 −Ed
t xt+1
induces dealers to revise their forecasts for Mt+τ between the start of weeks t and t +1 . Under
these circumstances, order ﬂows from week-t will have incremental forecasting power for Mt+τ
beyond that contained in st − ft.
We can clarify this distinction between the forecasting power of spot rates and order ﬂows with
the aid of a projection of Mt+τ on a constant, st − ft and xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1:5
Mt+τ = β + βs(st − ft)+βx(xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1)+ζt+τ, (19)
5We assume throughout that all these variables are covariance stationary so that the unconditional moments
presented below are well-deﬁned.
13where ζt+τ is the mean-zero projection error that identiﬁes the component of Mt+τ that is uncor-
related with both st − ft and xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1. Since these terms are uncorrelated with each other,
the projection coeﬃcients are given by
βs =
CV(Mt+τ,s t − ft)
V(st − ft)
and βx =
CV(Mt+τ,x t+1 − Ed
t xt+1)
V(xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1)
, (20)
where CV(.,.) and V(.) denote the unconditional covariance and variance operators, respectively.
Combining these expressions with (18) and the identity Mt+τ = Ed
t Mt+τ +( Ed
t+1 − Ed
t )Mt+τ +
(1 − Ed
t+1)Mt+τ gives
βs =
CV(E
d
t Mt+τ,
P∞
i=i ρiEd
t ηt+i)
V(st − ft)
and βx =
CV((Ed
t+1 − Ed
t )Mt+τ,x t+1 − Ed
t xt+1)
V(xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1)
.
(21)
To interpret the expressions in (21), recall that ρ =1 /(1+γε) where γε identiﬁes the sensitivity
of the expected interest diﬀerential, Ed
t (ˆ rt+i−rt+i), to variations in the expected real exchange rate,
Ed
t εt+i. Plausible values for γε should be positive but small (Clarida, Galı, and Gertler 1998), so ρ
should be close to one. This being the case, the expression for βs indicates that st − ft will have
greater forecasting power when dealer expectations, Ed
t Mt+τ, are strongly correlated with their
forecasts for expected inﬂation and/or output gaps over long horizons. In contrast, the expression
for βx shows that the forecasting power of order ﬂow only depends on the information it conveys to
dealers concerning Mt+τ. Recall from (14) that xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1 conveys information about ht and
E
n
t st+1 — two factors that embed more timely information about the current state of the economy
than is available to dealers from other sources. The expression for βx shows that order ﬂows will
have incremental forecasting power when dealers ﬁnd this information relevant for forecasting the
future course of Mt.
The preceding discussion suggests that we empirically investigate the forecasting power of spot
rates and order ﬂows for a macro variable Mt by estimating βs and βx from a regression of Mt+τ
on a constant, st − ft and xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1. Of course, to implement this approach we need data
on these variables over a suﬃciently long time span to estimate the moments in βs and βx with
precision. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to be the case in practice. Our data on order ﬂows
covers six an a half years — a longer time span than any other comparable data set — but it does
not contain many observations on standard macro variables such as output and inﬂation across a
variety of macroeconomic conditions. Consequently, the available time series on Mt,s t − ft and
xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1 are unlikely to have must statistical power for detecting the true values of βs and
βx. To address this problem, we implement a novel procedure that estimates the components of βs
and βx.
Let Ωt ⊂ Ωd
t denote a subset of the information available to dealers at the start of week t that
14includes Mt. Without loss of generality we can write
Mt+τ =
Xτ−1
i=−t Et+i + E[Mt+τ],
where Et = E[Mt+τ|Ωt+1] − E[Mt+τ|Ωt] is the week-t ﬂow of information into Ωt+1 concerning
Mt+τ, and E[Mt+τ]=E[Mt+τ|Ω0] denotes the unconditional expectation. Substituting this ex-
pression into (20) gives
βs =
Xτ−1
i=−tβi
s and βx =
Xτ−1
i=−tβi
x, (22)
where βi
s and βi
x are the coeﬃcients from the projection:
Et+i = βi + βi
s(st − ft)+βi
x(xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1)+ξt+i. (23)
Our strategy is to estimate this projection for diﬀerent horizons i using estimates of Et obtained
from a time series model (described below). Unlike the underlying macro time series, Mt, these
estimates can be computed at a high enough frequency for us to estimate βi
s and βi
x with precision
given the time span of our data. Of course, this increase in precision comes at a cost. Statistically
signiﬁcant estimates of βi
s and βi
x imply that st −ft and xt+1 −Ed
t xt+1 have forecasting power for
the ﬂow of information used to revise future expectations concerning Mt+τ. However, (22) shows
that this must be true at some horizon(s), i, if st − ft and xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1 truly have forecasting
power for Mt+τ. In sum, therefore, when we test the statistical signiﬁcance of horizon-speciﬁc βi
s
and βi
x w ea r ee x a m i n i n gan e c e s s a r yc o n d i t i o nf o rt h ee x i s t e n c eo ff o r e c a s t i n gp o w e ri ns p o tr a t e s
and order ﬂows.
To implement our procedure, two data issues need addressing. Since (23) includes unanticipated
order ﬂow, xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1, it appears that we need data on both xt+1 and dealers’ information,
Ωd
t , in order to estimate βi
x. Fortunately, an implication of our model makes this unnecessary.
Recall that dealers choose the risk premium such that Ed
t αt =0 , and xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1 = αt − Ed
t αt
because αt−1 ∈ Ωd
t . Combining these expressions with the market clearing condition in (9) gives
xt+1 −Ed
t xt+1 =
P∞
i=0 xt+1−i. Thus, the requirement of eﬃcient risk-sharing on the dealers’ choice
of risk premium implies that unexpected order ﬂow can be identiﬁed from the cumulation of current
and past order ﬂows, ˜ xt+1. The second issue concerns the identiﬁcation of the macro information
ﬂows, Et+i. We discuss this in the next subsection.
152.2 Data
Our empirical analysis uses a data set that includes end-user transaction ﬂows, spot rates, interest
rates and macro fundamentals over six and a half years. The transaction ﬂow data diﬀer in two
important respects from the data used in earlier work (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002a & 2002b).
First, they cover a much longer time period; January 1993 to June 1999. Second, they come from
transactions between end-users and a large bank, rather than from inter-bank transactions. Our
data cover transactions with three end-user segments: non-ﬁnancial corporations, investors (such
as mutual funds and pension funds), and leveraged traders (such as hedge funds and proprietary
traders). The data set also contains information on trading location, US versus Non-US. From this
we construct order ﬂows for six segments: trades executed in the US and non-US for non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms, investors, and leveraged traders. Though inter-bank transactions accounted for about two-
thirds of total volume in major currency markets at the time, they are largely derivative of the
underlying shifts in end-user currency demands. Our data include all the end-user trades with
Citibank in the largest spot market, the USD/EUR market, and the USD/EUR forward market.6
Citibank had the largest share of the end-user market in these currencies at the time, ranging
between 10 and 15 percent. The ﬂow data are aggregated at the daily frequency and measure in
$m the imbalance between end-user orders to purchase and sell euros.
There are many advantages of our transaction ﬂow data. First, the data are simply more
powerful, covering a much longer time span. Second, because the underlying trades reﬂect the
world economy’s primitive currency demands, the data provide a bridge to modern macro analysis.
Third, the three segments span the full set of underlying demand types. We shall see that those
not covered by extant end-user data sets are empirically important.7
In the analysis that follows we consider the joint behavior of exchange rates and order ﬂows at
the weekly frequency. The weekly timing of the variables is as follows: We take the log spot rate at
the start of week t, denoted by st, to be the log of the oﬀer rate (USD/EUR) quoted by Citibank at
what is generally the end of active trading on Friday of week t−1 (approximately 17:00 GMT). This
i sa l s ot h ep o i n ta tw h i c hw es a m p l et h ew e e k −t interest rates from Datastream. In our analysis
6Before January 1999, data for the Euro are synthesized from data in the underlying markets against the Dollar,
using weights of the underlying currencies in the Euro. Data on end-user transactions are only available from
Citibank in this synthesized form, so we cannot study the end-user transactions in individual currencies. That said,
transactions before 1999 are dominated by transactions in the Deutschemark/Dollar. Evans and Lyons (2002a) found
that 87% of the market-wide interdealer transactions between the Dollar and the underlying currencies in the Euro
involved trades in the Deutschemark/Dollar. This study also showed that Deutschemark/Dollar order ﬂow was the
most signiﬁcant determinant of daily spot rate changes in the other underlying currencies. Furthermore, the weekly
rates of depreciation in the individual currency/Dollar pairs are highly correlated with the weekly depreciation in the
Deutschemark/Dollar between January 1993 to December 1998: the median correlation is 0.95.
7Froot and Ramadorai (2005) consider the transactions ﬂows associated with portfolio changes undertaken by
institutional investors. Osler (2003) examines end-user stop-loss orders.
16below depreciation rates and interest rates are expressed in annual percentage terms. The week-t
ﬂow from segment j, xj, is computed as the total value in $m of euro purchases initiated by the
segment against Citibank’s quotes between the 17:00 GMT on Friday of week t − 1 and Friday of
week t. Positive values for these order ﬂows therefore denote net demand for euros.
Table 1: Order Flow Summary Statistics
Corporate Hedge Investor
US Non-US US Non-US US Non-US
A:
Mean -16.8 -59.8 -4.1 11.2 19.4 15.9
Standard Deviation 108.7 196.1 346.3 183.4 146.6 273.4
Autocorrelations
ρ1 -0.037 0.072 -0.021 -0.098 0.096 0.061
ρ2 -0.040 0.089 0.024 0.024 -0.024 0.107
ρ4 0.028 -0.038 0.126 0.015 -0.030 -0.030
ρ8 -0.028 0.103 -0.009 0.083 -0.016 -0.014
B: Cross-Correlations
Corporate Non-US -0.084
∗
Traders US 0.125
∗∗ -0.136
∗∗
Traders Non-Us 0.035 -0.026 0.066
Investors US -0.158
∗∗ 0.035 0.045 0.083
∗
Investors Non-US -0.029 -0.063 0.159
∗∗ -0.032 0.094
∗
Notes: The table reports weekly-frequency statistics for order ﬂows from end-user segments cumu-
lated over the week between January 1993 and June 1999. The last four rows of panel A report
autocorrelations ρi at lag i. Statistical signiﬁcance for the cross-correlations at the 10% and 5%
levels is denoted by “
∗”a n d“
∗∗”.
Summary statistics for the weekly order ﬂow data are reported in Table 1. The statistics in
panel A display two noteworthy features. First, the order ﬂows are large and volatile. Second, they
display no signiﬁcant serial correlation. At the weekly frequency, then, the end-user ﬂows appear
to represent shocks to the foreign exchange market arriving at Citibank. Panel B reports the
cross-correlations between the six ﬂows. These correlations are generally quite small, ranging from
approximately -0.16 to 0.16, but several are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Insofar
as these order ﬂows convey information to dealers, individual segments should not be viewed as
carrying entirely separate information.
We consider the forecasting power of spot rates and order ﬂows for three standard variables,
17GDP growth, CPI inﬂation, and M1 growth, both in the US and Germany.8 The ﬂow of macro
information for each of these variables is identiﬁed using the real-time estimation method developed
in Evans (2005). To understand how these information ﬂows are estimated, let Mq(i) denote US
GDP growth in quarter i that ends on day q(i) and let Rd denote the vector of scheduled US macro
data releases on day d. The individual data releases in Rd vary from day to day, but the identity
of upcoming releases is known in advance because release dates for each variable follow a preset
schedule. Rd includes monthly series like Nonfarm Payroll as well as the “Advance”, “Preliminary”
and “Final” GDP data for quarter i that are released on three days after q(i).
The real-time estimation method combines a time-series model for the daily increments to GDP
growth, ∆Md, where Mq(i) =
Pq(i)
d=q(i)+1 ∆Md; with a set of signaling equations that relate the
data releases in Rd to contemporaneous growth in GDP. For example, the Nonfarm Payroll release
is related to GDP growth during the month that the payroll data is collected. The resulting system
of equations is written in state space form:
Zd = AdZd−1 + Vd and Rd = CdZd + Ud, (24)
where Zd is the state vector on day d that includes current and lagged values of ∆Md.V d and
Ud are vectors of serially uncorrelated shocks. The matrices Ad and Cd vary deterministically over
each quarter to accommodate the preset sequence of releases in Rd and the temporal aggregation
of ∆Md into quarterly GDP growth. They also contain the parameters of the time series process
for ∆Md and the signaling equations. These parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood
with the aid of the Kalman Filter applied to (24). The real time estimate on day d of GDP growth
in the current quarter i is deﬁned as E[Mq(i)|Ωd] for d ≤ q(i), where Ωd comprises the history of
data releases, {Rd−i}i≥0. Estimates of E[Mq(i)|Ωd] are computed from E[Zd|Ωd] using the Kalman
Filter evaluated at the maximum likelihood parameter estimates. The real-time estimates of CPI
inﬂation and M1 growth are computed in a similar manner. A detailed description of the real-time
estimation procedure is presented in Evans (2005).
In our analysis below we use information ﬂows for the six macro variables estimated at a weekly
frequency. For example, in the case of GDP growth, the information ﬂow in week t is computed
as Et = E[Mq(i)|Ωw(t)] − E[Mq(i)|Ωw(t−1)] where w(t) denotes the last day of week t, and w(t) ≤
q(i). For the US variables, the information set, Ωd, includes the 3 quarterly releases on US GDP
8Although Citibank’s data on end-user ﬂows are primarily driven by Deutschemark/Dollar transactions before
the adoption of the Euro, we recognize the possibility that the end-user ﬂows in the other underlying currencies
could have carried incremental information relevant to the determination of other European interest rates that was
uncorrelated with Germany’s GDP and CPI. If this is the case, the empircal results we report below may understate
the degree to which end-user ﬂows in the Deutschemark/Dollar carry incremental information concerning Germany’s
GDP and CPI.
18and the monthly releases on 20 other US macro variables. The information ﬂows for the German
variables are computed using a speciﬁcation for Ωd that includes the 3 quarterly release on German
GDP and the monthly releases on 8 German macro variables.9 All series come from a database
maintained by Money Market News Services (M.M.S.) that contains details of each data release.
Notice that the information ﬂows we compute use speciﬁcations for Ωd that make Ωw(t−1) as u b s e t
of the information available to dealers at the start of week t.
The statistical properties of the macro information ﬂo w sa r es u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e2 . P a n e l
A shows that all the information ﬂows have sample means close to zero and display little serial
correlation. None of the autocorrelations are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Panel B reports
the cross-correlations between the six information ﬂows. Because the three US (German) ﬂows
are computed from the same set of US (German) data releases, it is not surprising to see some
signiﬁcant correlations between the US ﬂows and between the German ﬂows. However, none of the
cross correlations are particularly large. This signiﬁes that the data releases convey information
with diﬀerent relevance for diﬀerent variables. For example, the Nonfarm Payroll release may
induce a signiﬁcant revision in the real-time estimate of GDP growth but have little impact on
the real-time estimate of inﬂation. From this perspective, it appears that our six information ﬂows
convey distinctly diﬀerent macro information.
To address the statistical power of our resulting information ﬂow series, we compare each series’
power to forecast its own subsequent data release to a forecast from professional money managers.
On the Friday before each scheduled data release, M.M.S. surveys approximately forty money
managers on their estimate for the upcoming release. We computed the forecast error implied by
the median response from the survey as Mr − Es[Mr], where Mr is the value released on day r
and Es[Mr] is the median forecast from the survey conducted on day s (< r). The comparable
forecast error using the real-time estimates is computed as Mr − E[Mr|Ωs]. The mean and mean
square error for both sets of forecasts errors are reported in Panel C of Table 2. These statistics
show that the forecast errors implied by our estimated conditional expectations are comparable to
those based on the M.M.S. survey. This ﬁnding provides assurance that the macro information
ﬂows are not dominated by speciﬁcation error.
9The real-time estimates for US variables use data releases on: quarterly GDP, Nonfarm Payroll, Employment,
Retail Sales, Industrial Production, Capacity Utilization, Personal Income, Consumer Credit, Personal Consumption
Expenditures, New Home Sales, Durable Goods Orders, Construction Spending, Factory Orders, Business Inventories,
the Government Budget Deﬁcit, the Trade Balance, NAPM index, Housing Starts, the Index of Leading Indicators,
Consumer Prices and M1. The real-time estimates for German variables use data releases on GDP, Employment,
Retail Sales, Industrial Production, Manufacturing Output, Manufacturing Orders, the Trade Balance, Consumer
Prices and M1.
19Table 2: Summary Statistics for Macro Information Flows
US German
GDP Inﬂation M1 GDP Inﬂation M1
A:
Mean <0.001 <0.001 -0.006 0.002 0.002 0.022
Standard Deviation 0.200 0.030 1.379 0.526 0.806 1.454
Autocorrelations
ρ1 0.044 0.013 0.071 0.022 0.092 0.070
ρ2 0.103 -0.019 0.069 -0.008 0.021 0.081
ρ3 0.007 -0.004 0.039 -0.024 -0.029 0.125
ρ4 0.019 0.018 0.015 -0.026 -0.049 0.133
B: Cross Correlations
-0.047
0.120∗∗ 0.048
0.005 -0.040 0.024
0.023 -0.034 0.073∗ 0.413∗∗
0.006 0.046 0.020 -0.141∗∗ -0.112∗∗
C: Forecast Comparisons
M.M.S Mean 0.729 -0.327 0.399 0.132 -0.136 4.778
M.M.S. M.S.E 1.310 1.797 11.807 6.981 1.687 42.363
Real-Time Mean 0.190 0.054 0.033 -0.416 -0.035 -0.159
Real-Time M.S.E. 1.407 2.357 11.932 6.954 1.906 20.561
Notes: The table reports statistics for the macro information ﬂows concerning US GDP growth,
CPI inﬂation, and M1 growth, and German GDP growth, CPI Inﬂation, and M1 growth at the
weekly frequency between January 1993 and June 1999; 335 weekly observations. The last four
rows of Panel A report autocorrelations ρi at lag i. Panel C compares the mean and Mean Squared
Error (M.S.E.) of real-time estimates against the real-time errors computed from M.M.S. surveys of
professional money managers. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% and 5% level is denoted by ∗ and
∗∗, respectively.
2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 Macro Forecasting
We begin by examining the forecasting power of spot rates for the six macro information ﬂows. In
our model it is the diﬀerence between the current spot rate and fundamentals, st−ft,t h a ti d e n t i ﬁes
the potential forecasting power of spot rates. We proxy this diﬀerence with the depreciation rate,
∆st, and four interest rate spreads: the US default, commercial paper and term spreads and the
German term spread. The US and German term spreads, spt
t and b spt
t, are computed as the
diﬀerence between the 3-month and 5-year yields on government bonds. We compute the US
default spread, spd
t as the diﬀerence between Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield and Moody’s
20BAA corporate bond yield. The US commercial paper spread, spcp
t , is the diﬀerence between the
3-month commercial paper rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate. Before September 1997 we use the
3-month commercial paper rate, thereafter the 3-month rate for non-ﬁnancial corporations. The
spreads are computed from the interests rates on Friday of week t−1, and so represent information
that was available to dealers at the start of week t: if they have forecasting power for the macro
information ﬂows, dealers should have been able to forecast these macro ﬂows at the time.
We examine the forecasting power of the depreciation rate and spreads with two regressions. The
ﬁrst is a traditional regression where the dependent variable is the realized future macro variable.
The second uses the dependent variable proposed here, namely, our macro information ﬂow series.
For the ﬁrst, we regress the realized macro variable on a constant and the current values of the
depreciation rate and spreads. In the case of US GDP, the regression takes the form:
Mq(i) = ψ + ψs(sql(i) − sql(i−1))+ψtspt
ql(i) + ψdspd
ql(i) + ψcpspcp
ql(i) + ζq(i), (25)
where Mq(i) denotes the growth in GDP in quarter i that ends on day q(i) and ql(i)=q(i−1)+1.
This regression is estimated at the quarterly frequency using the depreciation rate and spreads at
the beginning of quarter i. We examine the forecasting power of the depreciation rate and spreads
for inﬂation and M1 growth with analogous regressions estimated at the monthly frequency (i.e.,
we estimate a monthly version of (25) with q(i) replaced by m(i), where m(i) denotes the last day
of month i). When forecasting German variables we replace the three US spreads with the German
term spread, b spt
t. All macro variables are expressed in annual percentage terms.
The second regression examines the forecasting power of the depreciation rates and spreads for
the macro information ﬂows at the weekly frequency. In this case the US regressions take the form:
Ek
t+k = βk + βk
s∆st + βk
tspt
t + βk
dspd
t + βk
cpspcp
t + ξt+k, (26)
where Ek
t+k =
Pk−1
i=0 Et+i. The dependent variable is the the ﬂow of information between the start
of weeks t and t + k concerning either GDP growth, inﬂation or M1 growth during the quarter or
month that includes week t + k (measured in annual percentage terms). As above, we replaced
the three US spreads with the German spread when estimating the German regressions. Our data
sample spans 335 weeks, so the estimates of (26) will be more precise provided the forecasting
horizon, k, is not too long. Below we report results for k = {4,13} that are representative of the
estimates we obtain at other horizons.
Table 3 reports the coeﬃcient estimates from regressions (25) and (26) for the six macro variables
together with asymptotic standard errors that correct for the presence of heteroskedasticity (White
1980) and the MA(k − 1) error structure induced by the overlapping forecasts in (26) (Newey and
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US German
∆ss p d spt spcp R2 ∆ss p t R2
A: GDP Growth
(i) -0.552 -6.855∗∗∗ 0.386 2.097 0.274 -5.688 3.267∗∗ 0.25
(0.574) (2.333) (0.333) (1.880) (10.736) (1.332)
(ii) k =4 -0.018 -0.357∗ 0.035 0.296∗∗∗ 0.066 -0.266∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.11
(0.029) (0.189) (0.025) (0.087) (0.076) (0.115)
(iii) k =1 3 -0.049 -0.298∗∗∗ 0.025 0.201∗∗∗ 0.125 -0.014 0.266∗∗∗ 0.19
(0.050) (0.101) (0.022) (0.072) (0.092) (0.059)
B: Inﬂation
(i) -0.072 0.046 0.024 0.073 0.033 -2.989 -0.917 0.07
(0.073) (0.131) (0.017) (0.072) (10.010) (0.641)
(ii) k =4 0.343 -0.698 0.448 -1.659 0.029 -0.443∗∗∗ -0.088 0.09
(0.344) (3.014) (0.342) (1.485) (0.124) (0.143)
(iii) k =1 3 0.832 -0.639 0.397 -1.664 0.085 0.058 -0.118 0.01
(0.641) (2.350) (0.326) (1.176) (0.168) (0.135)
C: M1 Growth
(i) 0.732 -14.736∗∗ 1.176∗ -0.969 0.163 -0.135 -6.243∗∗∗ 0.38
(3.823) (7.331) (0.696) (3.881) (1.867) (1.367)
(ii) k =4 -7.042 -4.947∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ -0.329 0.162 0.039 -1.385∗∗∗ 0.16
(4.634) (1.283) (0.143) (0.888) (0.179) (0.431)
(iii) k =1 3 2.662 -4.466∗∗ 0.314∗ -0.359 0.217 -0.249 -1.686∗∗∗ 0.47
(3.134) (1.200) (0.181) (0.976) (0.343) (0 .342)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of regression (25) in line (i) and regression (26) in lines (ii)
and (iii). In line (i) the dependent variable is GDP growth over the next quarter (panel A), inﬂation
over the next month (panel B) and M1 growth over the next month (panel C). In lines (ii) and (iii)
the dependent variables are the macro information ﬂows over k weeks concerning future GDP growth
(panel A), inﬂation (panel B) and M1 growth (panel C). The left and right hand columns report
estimates using US variables and German variables, respectively. The column headers show the
regressors in each regression. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parenthesis corrected for
heteroskedasticity (line i) and both heteroskedasticity and MA(k−1) serial correlation (lines ii and
iii). Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
West 1987). The table displays three noteworthy features. First, there is strong evidence in Panel
A that dealers had access to information with forecasting power for real GDP growth in both the
US and Germany. While the estimates of (25) in row (i) are based on just 24 observations and
so should be interpreted with caution, the estimates of (26) in rows (ii) and (iii) can be reliably
interpreted as indicating that dealers had access to information with forecasting power for both
US and German GDP growth. In particular, the estimates indicate that spd
t ,s p cp
t and b spt
t have
signiﬁcant forecasting power for the ﬂows of future macro information concerning GDP growth over
the next month (k =4 )and quarter (k =1 3 ) . The estimates in panel C indicate that the spreads
22have similar signiﬁcant forecasting power for information ﬂows concerning M1 growth. The second
feature concerns the forecastability of inﬂation. In contrast to panels A and C, only one of the
coeﬃcient estimates in panel B is statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, all of the regression R2
statistics are much smaller than their counterparts in the other panels. Since spreads are known
to have forecasting power for future inﬂation in other periods (e.g., Mishkin 1990), we attribute
these ﬁndings to the relative stability of inﬂation in our data sample. Finally, we note that the
depreciation rate has signiﬁcant forecasting power for the information ﬂows concerning just German
GDP growth and inﬂation. Clearly, dealers have access to much more precise information about
the future course of GDP and M1 growth than is indicated by depreciation rates alone.
We now turn to the central question: Does order ﬂow convey new information to dealers con-
cerning the future state of the macroeconomy? To address this question, we add the six end-user
ﬂows to the forecasting regression in (26):
Ek
t+k = βk + βk
s∆st + βk
tspt
t + βk
dspd
t + βk
cpspcp
t +
6 X
j=1
βk
j ˜ xj,t + ξt+k, (27)
where ˜ xj,t is the order ﬂow from segment j in weeks t − k to t.10 Estimates of the βk
j coeﬃcients
will reveal whether the end user ﬂows convey incremental information to dealers in week t about
the future ﬂow of macro information between weeks t and t + k concerning GDP growth, inﬂation
and M1 growth. We present the estimates of these coeﬃcients for the one month (k =4 )and
one quarter (k =1 3 )horizons in Table 4, together with Newey-West asymptotic standard errors
that correct for the forecast overlap. Table 4 also reports the results of a Wald test for the joint
signiﬁcance of all six βk
j coeﬃcients.
The results in Table 4 clearly show that our end user ﬂows carry information about the future
state of the macro economy. (We do not report the other coeﬃcients estimates from (27) to conserve
space.) The estimated coeﬃcients on ﬁve of the six ﬂows are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level in at least one of the forecasting regressions, and many are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
The coeﬃcients on the individual order ﬂow segments are quite diﬀerent from each other: some
are positive some are negative, some appear highly signiﬁcant in several equations, others in one or
two. Recall that order ﬂows are correlated across user types so no one coeﬃcient summarizes the
incremental information conveyed by an individual order ﬂow. We therefore refrain from placing
a structural interpretation on the individual estimates. That said, one clear pattern emerges from
the results. The order ﬂows collectively have more forecasting power at the one quarter (k =1 3 )
than one month (k =4 )horizon. In every case, the Wald tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the six
10Our results are robust to using order ﬂows cumulated over the past four weeks, i.e., t − 4 to t.
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k Corporate Traders Investors Wald R2
US Non-US US Non-US US Non-US p-value
A: US
GDP Growth
4 -0.054 -0.008 0.008 0.056 0.013 0072∗∗ 0.276 0.11
(0.106) (0.052) (0.022) (0.051) (0.053) (0033)
13 0.098∗ 0.016 -0.026∗∗ 0.008 -0.007 -0.015 0.001 0.28
(0.052) (0.019) (0.011) (0.021) (0.028) (0.020)
Inﬂation
4 -2.663∗ -0.048 0.259 0.622 -0.049 -0.244 0.635 0.06
(1.470) (0.691) (0.313) (0.714) (0.800) (0.395)
13 -1.047∗∗ 0.271 0.317∗∗ -0.349 -0.424 0.126 0.050 0.17
(0.481) (0.436) (0.145) (0.303) (0.398) (0.251)
M1 Growth
4 0.502 -0.353 -0.203 0.006 0.119 -0.171 0.533 0.18
(0.594) (0.299) (0.161) (0.347) (0.441) (0.210)
13 0.408 -0.122 0.055 -0.521∗∗∗ -0.865∗∗∗ -0.195 0.002 0.44
(0.285) (0.153) (0.070) (0.202) (0.226) (0.131)
B: German
GDP Growth
4 0.203 -0.001 0.077 -0.090 -0.112 0.117 0.354 0.15
(0.181) (0.097) (0.071) (0.091) (0.189) (0.107)
13 -0.064 -0.020 0.016 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.036 0.041 0.30
(0.091) (0.032) (0.021) (0.050) (0.060) (0.029)
Inﬂation
4 0.125 0.257 0.173∗ -0.252 0.199 0.062 0.183 0.13
(0.366) (0.173) (0.098) (0.243) (0.200) (0.125)
13 0.177 -0.044 0.007 -0.263∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗ 0.075 0.035 0.20
(0.158) (0.064) (0.048) (0.098) (0.111) (0.056)
M1 Growth
4 -0.500 0.101 -0.222 0.062 0.140 -0.028 0.541 0.18
(0.480) (0.304) (0.223) (0.339) (0.349) (0.219)
13 -0.258 -0.027 0.054 0.304∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ <0.001 0.67
(0.215) (0.112) (0.080) (0.120) (0.184) (0.065)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the βk
j coeﬃcients in regression (27) multiplied by 1000. The
dependent variables are the macro information ﬂows over k weeks concerning future GDP growth, inﬂation
and M1 growth in the US (panel A) and Germany (panel B). Asymptotic standard errors are reported in
parentheses corrected for heteroskedasticity and MA(k − 1) serial correlation. The column headed Wald
reports the p-value of the Wald statistic for the null of zero coeﬃcients on the six order ﬂows. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
24ﬂow coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level at the quarterly horizon. Furthermore, the R2
statistics in these regressions are on average about twice the size of their counterparts in the Table
3. By this measure, the ﬂows contain an economically signiﬁcant degree of incremental forecasting
power for the macro information ﬂows beyond that contained in the deprecation rates and spreads.
The incremental forecasting power of the six ﬂow segments extends over a wide range of hori-
zons. To show this, we computed the variance contribution of the ﬂows from the estimates of (27)
for horizons ranging from one week to two quarters. In particular, let Ek
t+k = ˆ β
k
+ b Et,∆s+ b Et,x+ˆ ξt+k
denote estimates of (27) where b Et,∆s = ˆ β
k
s∆st + ˆ β
k
tspt
t + ˆ β
k
dspd
t + ˆ β
k
cpspcp
t and b Et,x =
P6
j=1 ˆ β
k
j ˜ xj,t.
Multiplying both sides of this expression by Ek
t+k and taking expectations gives the following de-
composition for the variance of the k-horizon information ﬂow:
V(Ek
t+k)=CV(b Et,∆s,Ek
t+k)+CV(b Et,x,Ek
t+k)+CV(ˆ ξt+k,Ek
t+k).
T h ec o n t r i b u t i o no ft h eo r d e rﬂo w si sg i v e nb yt h es e c o n dt e r mo nt h er i g h t . W ec a l c u l a t e d
this contribution as the slope coeﬃcient in the regression of b Et,x on Ek
t+k; i.e., an estimate of
CV(b Et,x,Ek
t+k)/V(Ek
t+k). We also computed the standard error of this estimate with the Newey-
West estimator allowing for an MA(k − 1) error process.
Figure 2 plots the variance contributions of the order ﬂows together with 95 percent conﬁdence
bands for the six macro information ﬂows for horizons k =1 ,..,26. In ﬁve of the six cases, the
contributions rise steadily with the horizon and are quite sizable beyond one quarter. The exception
is US GDP growth, where the contribution remains around 15 percent from the quarterly horizon
onward. For perspective on these results, recall from Section 2.1 that order ﬂow has incremental
forecasting power for a macro variable Mt+τ when the projection coeﬃcient βs =
Pτ−1
i=−t βi
x diﬀers
from zero, where βi
x measures order ﬂows’ forecasting power for the ﬂow of information at horizon i
concerning Mt+τ. The plots in Figure 2 show that order ﬂows have considerable forecasting power
for the future ﬂows of information concerning GDP growth, inﬂation and M1 growth at all but the
shortest horizons. Clearly, then, these order ﬂows are carrying signiﬁcant information on future
macroeconomic conditions.
Our analysis to this point has been based on asymptotic inference. To insure that our results
concerning the forecasting power of order ﬂows are robust, we also constructed a bootstrap dis-
tribution for the regression estimates of (27) at the one- and two-quarter horizons (k =1 3 ,26).11
11Estimates of long-horizon forecasting regressions like (25) and (26) are susceptible to two well-known econometric
problems. First, the coeﬃcient estimates may suﬀer from ﬁnite sample bias when the independent variables are
predetermined but not exogenous. Second, the asymptotic distribution of the estimates provides a poor approximation
to the true distribution when the forecasting horizon is long relative to the span of the sample. Finite-sample bias
in the estimates of β
k
j is not a prime concern because our six ﬂow segments display little or no autocorrelation
and are uncorrelated with lagged information ﬂows. There should also be less of a size distortion in the asymptotic
25A: US GDP Growth B: German GDP Growth
C: US Inﬂation D: German Inﬂation
E: US M1 Growth F: German M1 Growth
Figure 2: Estimated Contribution of Order Flows to the Variance of Future In-
formation Flows concerning GDP growth, Inﬂation and M1 growth by forecasting
horizon, τ, measured in weeks. Dashed lines denote 95% percent conﬁdence bands
computed as ±1.96ˆ σ, where ˆ σ is the standard error of the estimated contribution.
The bootstrap distribution was constructed under the null hypothesis that the order ﬂows have no
incremental forecasting for the macro information ﬂows (see Appendix for details). We found that
the estimated coeﬃcients on the end-user ﬂows are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level when
compared against this distribution.
distribution than is found elsewhere. For example, Mark (1995) considered a case where the data span is less than ﬁve
times the length of his longest forecasting horizon. Here, we have 11 non-overlapping observations at the 2-quarter
horizon.
26T h er e s u l t si nT a b l e4a n dF i g u r e2c o n t r a s tw i t ht h eﬁndings of F&R. They found no evi-
dence of a long run correlation between real interest rate diﬀerentials and the transaction ﬂows of
institutional investors. As we noted above, this result is completely consistent with our theoretical
model: Order ﬂows can convey information to dealers about macro variables without there being
any long-run statistical relationship between order ﬂow and the variable in question. Our model
also provides perspective on why the incremental forecasting power of order ﬂows could increase
with the horizon. Recall from equation (14) that unexpected order ﬂow, xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1, contains
new information about the hedging demand, ht, and about the average of agents’ spot rate forecast
series, E
n
t st+1. Insofar as these two components embed agent’s expectations for monetary policy’s
full future path, they will convey information to dealers about the full future course of output, in-
ﬂation and monetary growth, not simply at short-horizons. We present further evidence consistent
with this interpretation below.12
2.3.2 Macro Information and the Risk Premium
If order ﬂows convey information about future macroeconomic conditions, how do dealers use
this information in determining their spot rate quotes? To address this question, recall that the
equilibrium spot rate follows
st =ˆ rt − rt + Ed
t
∞ P
i=1
ρimt+i − Ed
t
∞ P
i=0
ρiδt+i,
where mt = γπ (∆ˆ pt+1 − ∆pt+1)+γy (ˆ yt − yt)+
1−ρ
ρ (pt − ˆ pt). In principle, dealers could use the
information in order ﬂows to revise their forecasts for future macro fundamentals, mt, leaving their
forecasts for the risk premium on the euro, δt, unchanged. This would be consistent with the class
of macro models that treat the risk premium as a constant. Alternatively, dealers may ﬁnd the
information conveyed by order ﬂow useful for revising their forecasts of both mt and δt. In this case,
order ﬂows should have forecasting power for excess returns. For example, let ert+1 = ∆st+1+ˆ rt−rt
denote the log excess return on euros between the start of weeks t and t+1. Combining this deﬁnition
with (1) gives
ert+2 = δt+1 + st+2 − Ed
t+1st+1 = Ed
t δt+1 +(δt+1 − Ed
t δt+1)+( st+2 − Ed
t+1st+1).
12After the ﬁrst draft of this paper, Evans and Lyons (2004a), began circulating, Rime, Sarno, and Sojli (2007)
reported other forecasting results consistent with our ﬁndings. They examined the short-term forecasting power of
aggregate interdealer order ﬂow in the USD/EUR, USD/GBP and USD/JPY markets for speciﬁc macro data releases
scheduled in the next week. Their ﬁndings are based on a much shorter data sample.
27Order ﬂow from week t trading, xt+1 −Ed
t xt+1, cannot be correlated with either Ed
t δt+1 or (st+2 −
Ed
t+1st+1), and so will have forecasting power for excess returns between weeks t +1 and t +2 ,
when it induces dealers to revise their forecasts for the risk premium δt+1; i.e. when CV(δt+1 −
Ed
t δt+1,x t+1 − Ed
t xt+1) 6=0 .
We examine whether the information on future macroeconomic conditions is used to revise the
risk premium embedded in dealers’ quotes as follows: Let Ek
t+k now deﬁne the ﬂow of information
between the start of weeks t and t + k concerning a linear combination of macro variables.W e
considered: (i) the diﬀerence between US and German GDP growth, ∆y − ∆ˆ y; (ii) the diﬀerence
b e t w e e nU Sa n dG e r m a ni n ﬂation, ∆p−∆ˆ p; (iii) the diﬀerence between US and German M1 growth,
∆m − ∆ˆ m; (iv) the growth in the US M1/GDP ratio, ∆m − ∆y; (v) the growth in the German
M1/GDP ratio, ∆ˆ m − ∆ˆ y; and (vi) the diﬀerence between the US and German M1/GDP growth
rates (∆m− ∆y) −(∆ˆ m− ∆ˆ y). F o re a c hc o m b i n a t i o n ,w eﬁrst computed the predicted order ﬂow
component, b Et,x, from the forecasting regression in (27) with k =1 3 . We then estimated
∆τst+τ = b + br(rτ
t − ˆ rτ
t )+bxb Et,x + vt+τ, (28)
where rτ
t and ˆ rτ
t denote the τ-week rates on euro-dollar and euro-deutschemark deposits at the
start of week t. If the order ﬂows contain incremental information about the linear combination
of macro variables over the next 13 weeks that dealers use to revise the risk premium, then the
estimates of bx should be signiﬁcant. We include the interest diﬀerential on the right hand side of
(28) with an unrestricted coeﬃcient br to accommodate variations in the ex ante risk premia that
are unrelated to order ﬂow. If these variation are absent, br should equal one.
Table 5 reports the estimates of (28) for horizons τ = {1,4} weeks.13 T h er e s u l t sa r er a t h e r
striking. First, the estimates of the bx coeﬃcients display a similar pattern across the forecast
horizons. The coeﬃcients on the components involving the GDP growth and inﬂation are small
and statistically insigniﬁcant. By contrast, the coeﬃcients on the components with M1 growth,
M1/GDP growth and the M1/GDP growth diﬀerentials are all highly signiﬁcant. This constitutes
direct empirical evidence that the order ﬂows convey information about the future course of the
macroeconomy, and that dealers use this information to revise the risk premia embedded in their
spot rate quotes. More speciﬁcally, the expression for the risk premium in (12) implies that
δt+1 − Ed
t δt+1 =( Ed
t+1 − Ed
t )(st+2 − E
n
t+1st+2) − α−1
s (Ed
t+1 − Ed
t )ht+1,
13Because we estimate the order ﬂow component, e Et,x, we need to account for sampling variation when computing
the standard errors of the coeﬃcient estimates. For this purpose we use an IV procedure akin to 2SLS: We replaced
e Et,x by E
k
t+k i n( 2 8 )a n dt h e nu s e de Et,x as an instrument for E
k
t+k.T h e c o e ﬃcient estimates are identical to OLS.
Their standard errors are computed from the IV procedure with the Newey and West (1987) covariance estimator
that allows for the presence of heteroskedasticity and an MA(τ − 1) error process.
28so dealers will adjust the risk premium upward when they infer from order ﬂow that on average
agents are underestimating the future depreciation of the dollar by a larger amount; i.e., when
(Ed
t+1 − Ed
t )(st+2 − E
n
t+1st+2) > 0. This will happen, for example, when dealers’ raise their ex-
pectations for the future path of the interest diﬀerential, ˆ rt+i − rt+i, relative to the average path
expected by agents. In other words, when the information in order ﬂow leads dealers to expect
a looser (tighter) future US (German) monetary policy than the average forecast outside of the
foreign exchange market. Under these circumstances, order ﬂows forecasting looser (tighter) fu-
ture monetary conditions in the US (Germany) should induce dealers to raise the risk premium
on the euro, with the result that the order ﬂows forecast positive future returns on the euro. The
signs of the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the M1/GDP growth components in Table 5 are
consistent with this explanation.
The second noteworthy feature concerns the R2 statistics. They rise from less than 6 percent
to 14 percent as we move from the one week to one month forecasting horizon. By comparison,
the R2 statistics from Fama-style regressions of future returns on the interest diﬀerentials alone are
typically less than 3 percent. Here all the forecasting power comes from the order ﬂow component,
b Et,x. If (28) is re-estimated without the interest diﬀerentials, the bx estimates and R2 statistics are
essentially unchanged. Our results are also robust to imposing br =1as a restriction.
Of course, a logical possibility is that dealers revise the risk premium in their spot quotes in
response to order ﬂows, but part of the reason is unrelated to future macroeconomic conditions. If
this is the case, order ﬂows should have forecasting power for future (excess) returns beyond that
found in b Et,x. The right hand column of Table 5 provides statistical evidence on this possibility.
Here we report the p-values of LM statistics for the null hypothesis that the residuals from (28)
are unrelated to the six ﬂows. As the table shows, the p-values are well above 5 percent in all the
cases where the estimated bx coeﬃcients appear signiﬁcant.
The results in Table 5 provide a macro-based explanation for the forecasting results ﬁrst re-
ported in Evans and Lyons (2005). There we showed that end-user ﬂows had signiﬁcant out-of-
sample forecasting power for excess currency returns at the four-week horizon.14 Our ﬁndings in
Table 5 indicate that this forecasting power stems from the fact that order ﬂows convey signiﬁcant
information about future macroeconomic conditions, speciﬁcally M1 and GDP growth, that deal-
ers use to revise the risk premia they embed in their spot rate quotes. To our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst piece of empirical evidence identifying the process by which macroeconomic information
14These ﬁndings are consistent with the results of in-sample forecasting tests. In an earlier version of this paper we
showed that Citibank’s order ﬂows forecast euro returns at horizons of two to four weeks with in-sample R
2 statistics
of approximately 8 to 16 percent (results available on request). We recognize that the relative merits of in-sample and
out-of-sample evaluation methods are the subject of debate in the econometrics literature (Inoue and Kilian 2005),
but they do not appear important in the present context.
29Table 5: Forecasting Returns
ˆ r − r ∆y − ∆ˆ y ∆p − ∆ˆ p ∆m − ∆ˆ m ∆m − ∆y ∆ˆ m − ∆ˆ y (∆m − ∆y) R2 LM
−(∆ˆ m − ∆ˆ y) p-value
Horizon τ =1
-0.229 -0.229 <0.01 0.249
(0.369) (0.949)
-0.194 -0.290 <0.01 0.202
(0.367) (0.507)
0.161 0.589** 0.02 0.981
(0.387) (0.218)
0.04 0.436** -0.700** 0.03 0.993
(0.398) (0.280) (0.281)
0.110 0.585** 0.02 0.979
(0.381) (0.219)
0.136 0.639** 0.06 0.571
(0.310) (0.184)
Horizon τ =4
-0.214 -0.094 <0.01 <0.001
(0.315) (0.651)
-0.200 -0.106 <0.01 <0.001
(0.327) (0.383)
0.248 0.709** 0.14 0.236
(0.316) (0.156)
0.122 0.564** -0.799** 0.14 0.166
(0.302) (0.193) (0.186)
0.186 0.697** 0.13 0.120
(0.307) (0.162)
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients and IV asymptotic standard errors from regression (28) for horizons
τ = {1,4} weeks. b Et,x is the predicted component of the macro information ﬂow estimated in (27) with
k =1 3 , based on the linear combination of variables listed at the head of each column. The right-hand
column reports the p-value of LM statistics for the null that the regression residuals are unrelated to order
ﬂows. Standard errors correct for heteroskedasticity and the MA(τ−1) error process induced by overlapping
forecasts. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
determines the foreign exchange risk premium.
3C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this paper was to revisit the long-standing forecasting puzzles in exchange rate eco-
nomics to determine whether the information role of order ﬂow provides resolution. We developed
a structural model for both the contemporaneous relationship between ﬂows, rates, and funda-
30mentals and the implied forecasting relationship. The contemporaneous relationship arises because
transaction ﬂows reveal macroeconomic information that was previously dispersed, and therefore
not fully impounded in the exchange rate. The forecasting relationship arises because the same
macro information revealed by ﬂows is useful for determining the foreign exchange risk premium,
generating rational forecastability in excess returns. We then examined the empirical implica-
tions of the model. We found that transaction ﬂows have signiﬁcant forecasting power for macro
fundamentals — incremental forecasting power beyond that contained in exchange rates and other
variables. We also showed that transaction ﬂows have signiﬁcant forecasting power for exchange
rate returns. Our model provides a rational interpretation for these forecastable returns in that
the macro information being revealed by ﬂows is important for determining the foreign exchange
risk premium. In sum, we ﬁnd strong support for the idea that exchange rates vary as the market
assimilates dispersed macro information from transaction ﬂows.
We conclude with some perspective. Our results provide a qualitatively diﬀerent view of why
macroeconomic variables perform so poorly in accounting for exchange rates at horizons of one
year or less. This view is diﬀerent from both the traditional macro and the emerging “micro”
perspectives. Unlike the macro perspective, we do not view all new information concerning macro
fundamentals as being impounded from public-information sources. Much information about macro
fundamentals is initially microeconomically dispersed. The market needs to assimilate implications
for the spot exchange rate, and for other asset prices, via trading. It is this assimilation process
that accounts for (much of) the disturbances in exchange rate equations. Our approach also diﬀers
from the extant micro perspective because models oﬀered thus far (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002a
&2002b) have interpreted the information conveyed by transaction ﬂows as orthogonal to macro
fundamentals. Most readers of this micro literature have adopted the same view. Our ﬁndings, by
contrast, suggest that transaction ﬂows are central to the process of impounding information into
exchange rates. In particular, they point to the existence of a transaction-mediated link between
the foreign exchange risk premium and the macroeconomy that is new to the literature. In light
of the long-standing diﬃculty of relating excess currency returns to conventional measures of risk
(see Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, Rebelo, Hall, and Hall 2008 for a recent contribution),
exploring this link should be a high priority for future exchange rate research.
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A Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n We derive the equilibrium of the model in three steps. First we conjecture
how the ﬂows of information received by dealers and agents relate to current macroeconomic con-
ditions. Second, we use these conjectures to identify dealers’ and agents’ estimates of the current
state of the economy. Equations for the equilibrium spot rate, risk premia and order ﬂow are then
derived from these estimates. Finally, we use these equations to verify that dealers and agents
receive information in the form conjectured in the ﬁrst step.
Recall that the vector Zt =[u0
t,u 0
t−1, ..., u0
t−k−1,z 0
t−k ]0 contains the information that
is potentially available to dealers and agents about the state of macroeconomy in week t, zt, and
that its dynamics are represented by the AR(1) process in (15): Zt = AZt−1 + But. Let Zd
t =
[ zo0
t ,z 0
t−k,x t ]0 and Zn
t =[zo0
t ,z 0
t−k,s t zn0
t ]0 denote the vectors of information observed by
all dealers and agent n in week t. We ﬁrst conjecture that
Zd
t = CZt, and Zn
t = CnZt + Dnvn
t . (A1)
Next, we use (15) and (A1) to characterize the behavior of Ed
t Zt and En
t Zt. Applying the Kalman
ﬁlter to (15) and (A1) gives
Ed
t Zt = AEd
t−1Zt−1 + GCA(Zt−1 − Ed
t−1Zt−1)+GCBut, and
En
t Zt = AEn
t−1Zt−1 + GnCnA
¡
Zt−1 − En
t−1Zt−1
¢
+ GnCnBut + GnDnvn
t ,
where G and Gn are Kalman gain matrices for the dealers’ and agents’ inference problems. Let Σu
and Σv denote the covariance matrices for ut and vn
t respectively. Then these gain matrices can be
written as
G = ΣdC0 ¡
CΣdC0¢−1 and Gn = ΣnCn0 ¡
CnΣnCn0 + DnΣvDn0¢−1 (A2)
where Σi = A
¡
(I − GiCi)Σi¢
A0 + BΣuB0 for i = {d,n}. Combining these expressions with (15)
34gives us the following equations for the estimation errors
Zt − Ed
t Zt =
∞ X
i=0
{(I − GC)A}
i (I − GC)But−i, and (A3)
Zt − En
t Zt =
∞ X
i=0
{(I − GnCn)A}
i ©
(I − GnCn)But−i − GnDnvn
t−i
ª
. (A4)
Because the inference problem facing all agents n ∈ [0,1] involves the same Cn,D n and Σv, matrices,
Gn is also the same across all agents. This means that the agent-speciﬁcs h o c k s ,{ vn
t−i}, are the only
source of heterogeneity in the estimation errors, Zt − En
t Zt. Furthermore, under our information
assumptions all the elements of (I − GC)But−i for i ≥ k are in Ωd
t , so no linear combination of
these elements can aﬀect Zt − Ed
t Zt. {(I − GC)A}
i must therefore be equal to null matrices for
i ≥ k, so (A3) becomes
Zt − Ed
t Zt =
k−1 X
i=0
{(I − GC)A}
i (I − GC)But−i =
k−1 X
i=0
Γiut−i = ΘdZt, (A5)
because {ut,u t−1,...ut−k+1} are elements of Zt. Similarly, since all the elements of (I−GnCn)But−i
for i ≥ k are also in Ωn
t , (A4) becomes
Zt − En
t Zt =
k−1 X
i=0
{(I − GnCn)A}
i (I − GnCn)But−i −
∞ X
i=0
{(I − GnCn)A}
i GnDnvn
t−i,
So aggregating across agents gives
Zt − E
n
t Zt =
k−1 X
i=0
{(I − GnCn)A}
i (I − GnCn)But−i = ΘnZt. (A6)
We can thus identify dealers’ and the average of agents’ estimates of Zt as
Ed
t Zt = ΦdZt and E
n
t Zt = ΦnZt, (A7)
where Φd = I − Θd and Φn = I − Θn.
We now use (A7) to derive equations for the spot rate, risk premium and order ﬂow. For this
purpose recall that z0
t =[∆ˆ pt − ∆pt, ˆ rt − rt, ˆ pt − pt, ˆ yt − yt, ..., ... ], so ∆ˆ pt − ∆pt =  1zt,
ˆ rt − rt =  2zt, etc., for some selection vectors,  i. Furthermore, equation (8) implies that zt =
Buut + AzBuut−1 + A2
zBuut−1 + ...Ak
zzt−k = ΛzZt, so we can write ∆ˆ pt − ∆pt =  1ΛzZt = Λ∆pZt,
ˆ rt − rt =  2ΛzZt = ΛrZt, and so on. We show below that δt = ΛδΦdZt, so with the aid of (15) we
35c a nu s e( 1 1 )a n dt h ef a c tt h a tEd
t [ˆ rt − rt − δt]=ˆ rt − rt − δt to write
st =
n
Λr − Λδ +( γπΛ∆pA + λyΛy +
1−ρ
ρ Λp − ΛδΦd)(I − ρA)−1ρA
o
Ed
t Zt = ΛsEd
t Zt. (A8)
We can now use (A7) and (A8) to write the aggregate demand for foreign currency by agents in
(6) as
αt = αs(Ed
t ∆st+1 +ˆ rt − rt)+αs(E
n
t − Ed
t )st+1 + ht,
= αsδt + αsΛsΦd(E
n
t − Ed
t )Zt+1 + ht. (A9)
Eﬃcient risk-sharing implies that dealers choose δt such that Ed
t αt =0 . Combining this restriction
with expression above gives the following equation for the risk premium:
δt = ΛsΦdEd
t (Ed
t − E
n
t )Zt+1 − α=1
s Ed
t ht
=
©
ΛsΦdA(Φd − Φn) − α=1
s Λh
ª
Ed
t Zt = ΛδEd
t Zt. (A10)
(A9) can now be rewritten as
αt = {αsΛsΦdA(Φn − Φd)+Λh}(Zt − Ed
t Zt)=−αsΛδ(Zt − Ed
t Zt). (A11)
Since dealers know the history of order ﬂow and αt−1 =
P∞
i=0 xt−i by market clearing, αt−1 ∈ Ωd
t .
Consequently, unexpected order ﬂow from week-t trading is xt+1 −Ed
t xt+1 =( αt −αt−1)−Ed
t (αt−
αt−1)=αt − Ed
t αt. Under eﬃcient risk-sharing Ed
t αt =0so
xt+1 − Ed
t xt+1 = αt = −αsΛδ(Zt − Ed
t Zt). (A12)
Equations (A8), (A10) and (A12) give the expressions in the proposition.
Finally, we verify our conjecture in (A1). Combining (A11) with the market clearing condition,
xt = αt−1 − αt−2, gives
xt = αsΛδ(Zt−1 − Ed
t−1Zt−1) − αsΛδ(Zt−2 − Ed
t−2Zt−2).
We established in (A5) that Zt − Ed
t Zt =
Pk−1
i=0 Γiut−i. Substituting these estimation errors into
t h ee x p r e s s i o na b o v eg i v e s
xt = αsΛδΓ0ut−1 + αsΛδ
k−2 X
i=1
(Γi − Γi−1)ut−i−1 − αsΛδΓk−1ut−k−1 = ΛxZt, (A13)
36because {ut−1,u t−1,...ut−k−1} are all elements in Zt. Let zo
t = czt = ΛoZt denote the subset
of variables in zt that are contemporaneously observed by dealers and agents. We can now use
equations (A7), (A8) and (A13) to rewrite (A1) as
Zd
t ≡
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎣
zo
t
zt−k
xt
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎦ =
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎣
Λo
00... 0 I
Λx
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
ut
ut−1
. . .
ut−1−k
zt−k
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
= CZt, (A14)
and
Zn
t ≡
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
zo
t
zt−k
st
zn
t
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
=
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
cΛz
00... 0 I
ΛsΦd
Λz
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
ut
ut−1
. . .
ut−1−k
zt−k
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
+
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0
0
. . .
0
I
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
vn
t . (A15)
We have thus veriﬁed our conjecture and established that the equilibrium of the model is as de-
scribed by the proposition.
Bootstrap Distribution We constructed the bootstrap distribution for the regression estimates
from regression (27) as follows: First we estimated a fourth-order VAR for the weekly change in log
spot rate, ∆st, the spreads ({spt
t,sp d
t ,sp cp
t } for the US, b spt
t for Germany) and the six ﬂow segments,
˜ xj,t. Next, for each of the six macro variables we consider, we generated a pseudo data series
spanning 335 weeks for the k-week information ﬂows, Ek
t+k =
Pk−1
i=0 Et+i, by bootstrap sampling
from the weekly estimates, Et+i.(Recall that the E0
ts are serially uncorrelated.) Pseudo data series
for ∆st, the spreads and xj,t are similarly generated by bootstrap sampling from the VAR residuals.
Notice that under this data generation process, realizations of Ek
t+k are independent from the other
variables. We then use the pseudo data to estimate equation (27) at the one quarter (k =1 3 )
and two quarter (k =2 6 )horizons. This process is repeated 5000 times to construct a bootstrap
distribution for the regression estimates under the null hypothesis that spot rates, spreads and
order ﬂows have no forecasting power for the information ﬂows concerning our six macro variables.
37